

THE SITUATION IN HONDURAS

A STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



DECEMBER 1982

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1983

12-266 O

S382-1

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., November 19, 1982.

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a report of a study mission to Honduras, September 23 to October 1, 1982.

Honduras has been the focus of considerable policy concern over the past year. It is surrounded by three neighbors, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, each of which has been experiencing political turmoil and crises of political change and institutional transformation. Honduras is the poorest country in Central America, and, like its neighbors, is experiencing severe economic distress, the result of global recession, unfavorable primary commodity prices, and regional instability. At the same time, it has embarked on a democratic experiment after 10 years of military government and a long history of military interventions and political instability.

The purpose of the September study mission was to assess for the Committee the nature of political and economic concerns in Honduras, the level of tensions between Honduras and its neighbors, and the impact of events in Honduras on the overall Central American political and military situation. The mission offered an opportunity to consult in detail with U.S. embassy officials, with officials of the Honduran Government and with Hondurans representative of a broad spectrum of political and economic opinion. I was able to travel to major refugee areas and talk with Salvadorans and Nicaraguans residing in refugee camps in Honduras and to explore the level of U.S. military presence and assistance in Honduras as well. In addition, I was able to accept an invitation to participate in a 3-day national issues seminar sponsored by the Honduran armed forces for the purpose of engaging military and civilian leaders in dialogue on national concerns.

On many points, United States and Honduran perspectives differed. I sought in all cases to represent to Hondurans the variety of views held by members of the Committee and the American public. In this report, I have sought to reflect the same variety of Honduran views. I very much appreciated the hospitality extended to me by the Honduran Government, the United States Embassy in Tegucigalpa, and by many Hondurans in public and private life.

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I hope that the information contained in this report is useful to the Committee in its review of U.S. policy in Central America and toward Honduras.

(Dr.) MARGARET DALY HAYES,
Professional Staff Member.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

This report is based on information gathered and impressions formed during 3 days of seminar on national issues sponsored by the Honduran Armed Forces with participation of the Chief of Staff, heads of services and senior officers, as well as representatives of political parties, labor leaders, the press, university representatives and others. In addition, I traveled to the airfields being enhanced with U.S. assistance; visited three refugee areas, and was able to meet privately with a broad representation of political opinion leaders in the country. The report is divided into five chapters covering the political situation; the economic situation; the security climate; the refugee situation; and human rights.

HIGHLIGHTS

There is widespread support for the newly elected civilian Government in Honduras, but that government faces severe challenges in building responsible democratic political institutions where none previously functioned at a time of rising terrorist activity and extreme economic hardship. The present leadership will have great difficulty in satisfying immediate expectations of rewards from the new system.

Honduras' economy is in serious difficulty with growth stagnant for the past 3 years. Petroleum import costs, sharp declines in the prices of basic commodity exports and capital flight inspired by regional instability are the principal factors affecting the economic situation. Honduras has undertaken a severe austerity program to bring the economy under control, but continued compliance is threatened by the negative prospects for Honduras' principal exports. Honduras has considerable production potential, and prospects would brighten if the world economic situation would improve.

Honduras is surrounded by three countries—Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala—that are experiencing political upheaval. Honduras perceives threats to its own security from internal terrorist activities and from the military buildup on its borders, especially from Nicaragua. Authorities regard their current military modernization program as an appropriate response to the dramatic arms buildup perceived in Nicaragua. Hondurans do not trust the current Nicaraguan Government and blame it for the rise in subversive activity in their own country. Nevertheless, Honduras has undertaken a number of initiatives with Nicaragua and high-level contacts are regular.

Honduras presently hosts a refugee population of 35,000, including about 15,000 each Nicaraguans and Salvadorans. Historical factors and the proximity of Salvadoran guerrilla strongholds to the refugee areas make the Salvadoran presence in Honduras very sensitive. Honduras recognizes the sensitivity of the Nicaraguan refugee presence in the country. The government has not yet found the means to move the refugees from the border areas.

Most Hondurans assess the human rights situation in their country as good, but threatened by rising violence. They fear that the increase in terrorist activities in the country will contribute to abuses of rights by authorities.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The most serious political problems facing Honduras at present are those associated with building democratic institutions where none existed before. The effort, to which nearly all sectors of the population are committed, is hampered by a recently increased incidence of terrorist activities in the country and by unfavorable near term economic prospects. Honduras elected its first civilian government in 10 years in November 1981. President Roberto Suazo Córdova took office in January 1982. The President received nearly 55 percent of the votes cast in an election in which 81 percent of the eligible electorate voted. Suazo Córdova is the second Liberal Party candidate to occupy Honduras' presidency in the last 50 years.

While there is great support within Honduras for democratic institutions and the margin of support the President received in the elections gives him some space within which to operate, expectations are also high that a democratic system will provide rewards that previous military dictatorships did not. The President has few resources with which to demonstrate that this is true, and it is to be expected that popular criticisms of the government will increase in the future.

Honduras' political institutions are in serious need of modernization and revitalization. The legal system is ill-prepared to handle cases of allegations of corruption or police brutality. Many accuse party politicians of taking greater interest in their parties than in the problems of the country.

The military is still the strongest single political institution in the country, and many continue to look to the army for political leadership. There is, nevertheless, a conscious effort on the part of the military leadership to allow civilians to take the lead in policy. General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez insisted in private conversation that he regards himself as subordinate to the President, though he occupies a unique position within the cabinet.

The military is not monolithic. Álvarez is direct and hardnosed. He is rated high for efforts in professionalizing the armed forces. He is criticized by some for an exceptionally hard-line attitude toward Nicaragua, though this attitude is widely shared among both political and military leaders. Some officers did express concern that Honduras' current posture toward Nicaragua was too aggressive, and some worried that General Álvarez was becoming isolated from opinion within his own ranks. There was a recognition

that police brutality had to be controlled because it reflected badly on the army.

Relations with the church are troubled, and church officials express concern at the absence of good lines of communication to the government. Recently the Honduran bishops have issued a pastoral letter decrying violence of the left and the right and giving strong support to the development of democratic institutions in the country.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The economic situation in Honduras is grim, and neither current regional instability nor world economic prospects auger well for early relief. Honduran petroleum import costs have risen 2.5 times since 1978 and currently absorb 10 percent of foreign exchange. Honduras' principal sources of foreign exchange are coffee, sugar and bananas, prices for which are at record lows. Honduras was recently allocated a particularly small share of the world coffee market in negotiations of the International Coffee Agreement in London. Sugar quotas imposed by the United States will give it 1 percent of the U.S. market, or only 28,000 tons, compared with about 110,000 metric tons export capacity. Capital flight due to regional political instability and abuses of exchange controls, has been another problem for the Honduran Government. One estimate put capital flight at \$500 million in the last 3 years.

Honduras has just signed an agreement with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) for a \$104 million standby to cover short-term needs. The agreement requires that Honduras accept a series of very difficult austerity measures. Previous Honduran governments have not been able to remain in compliance with Fund austerity recommendations. IMF support, plus other multilateral and bilateral lending and Caribbean Basin support of \$35 million will cover most of Honduras' balance-of-payments gap this year. Previous Honduran governments contributed to the present debt situation by overspending and tolerating, if not promoting, corruption, especially in state enterprises. The present government has sharply curtailed corrupt practices in autonomous agencies, and President Suazo has promised that Honduras will pay all of its debt. The government's principal preoccupation now is to avoid being saddled with private enterprise debts that were contracted through the National Investment Corporation (CONADI). If commodity prices and the world economy should improve in the next year, Honduras' economic prospects would not be so bleak. The country's debt is manageable if exports improve, and in 1985 a major hydroelectric powerplant will come on stream that will allow Honduras to export energy while reducing its petroleum imports dramatically. U.S. economic assistance to Honduras in 1982 amounted to \$87 million. A total of \$63 million is planned for 1983.

THE SECURITY CLIMATE

Honduras perceives threats to its security from (1) terrorist and subversive activities being promoted internally, and (2) Nicaraguan air and ground forces being or likely to be postured against it. The Suazo government adopted a new policy regarding use of Honduran

territory for transshipment of supplies to guerrilla units in Guatemala or El Salvador or as a retreat for Salvadoran guerrilla combat forces. The government believes the left is retaliating for this policy by stepping up terrorist actions against Honduras. It clearly blames Nicaragua for spearheading this reaction. The government has broken at least 12 safehouses in Honduras in the past year, 6 of these in the August-September time frame.

The Honduran Armed Forces are straightforward in their assessment of the threat from Nicaragua; they are quite sober in their assessment of what needs to be done and their own capabilities. It was my firm perception that they were not prepared to carry a war to Nicaragua. However, they believe that upgrading their own forces is an appropriate response to Nicaragua's escalation of military manpower from 6,700 to 50,000; its acquisition of Soviet T-55 tanks and its anticipated acquisition of MIG jets. Honduras is confident of the capability of its existing air force of Super Mystere and A-37s if Nicaragua acquires MIG 17s or 19s. Honduras is also concerned about the outcome of the political and military struggle in El Salvador.

Honduras is frustrated in its relationship with the United States because it sees a much lower level of support (from the Administration as well as from the public) than it expected when it embarked on its democratic experiment. Both President Suazo and military leaders expressed perplexity at what they perceived was an inability of the U.S. public to recognize the severity of the political threat in Central America. Both espoused a similar hard line toward Marxists in the region, arguing that the Marxists were not content not to interfere in the policies of their neighbors.

U.S. military assistance to Honduras amounted to \$31.3 million in 1982, and will be \$15.3 million in 1983. Because of increased U.S. security focus on the Central American region since 1978-79, U.S. interactions with the Honduran armed forces have increased significantly in the past 2-3 years. The number of visits to Honduras by representatives of the Defense Department has surpassed the number of visits by representatives from other agencies. This imbalance may have contributed to concerns over the "militarization" of relations in the region.

THE REFUGEE SITUATION

Honduras currently hosts 30,000 to 35,000 refugees from El Salvador, Nicaragua (about half from each) and Guatemala. The Honduran Government has not given adequate attention to the refugee problem, and it should be urged to do so. There are two camps on the Salvadoran border—Mesa Grande, about 30 kilometers from the border, and Colomoncagua, about 3 kilometers. The differences are striking. Mesa Grande is tranquil, the people energetic and the atmosphere communicating a positive impression in spite of many problems it still has. Colomoncagua is depressing. There is considerable tension between representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and local military authorities at Colomoncagua. UNHCR access to the camp is restricted; police and army are accused of harassing the residents. Knowledgeable Honduran officials recognize that the camp has been used by Salva-

doran guerrillas and that some of the relief organizations have aided the guerrillas, passing food and medicine to them. There are plans to move the camp to a point about 100 kilometers to the interior, and these should be encouraged with due speed.

About 13,000 Miskito and Sumo Indians have come into Honduras from Nicaragua in its remote eastern department. UNHCR provides relief, and because of ethnic compatibility and relative lack of population in the areas, Honduran authorities intend to allow the Indian refugees to integrate into their own society. In the middle border area around the department capital of Danli, an entirely different refugee population of ethnic Nicaraguans has begun to develop; about 3,600-4,000 Nicaraguans have come over the border since April 1982. In part because of the sensitive political situation, UNHCR delayed in granting refugee status to these people when Honduras petitioned UNHCR Geneva Headquarters that they be declared refugees. However, in November 1982 UNHCR approved refugee status for the Nicaraguans, but aid will not be forthcoming until the refugees are moved from the border area. Local Honduran relief organizations, Caritas, and an ad hoc Committee for the Relief of Nicaraguan Refugees, formed by the Nicaraguan exile community, provide relief at present, but these resources are scarce to inadequate. The principal reasons given by refugees for departure is "did not agree with the regime." Peasant farmers protested the confiscation of their crops; young men resisted impressment into the militia.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights issues have received new attention because of the heightened tension with border countries and continued concern over the precise role of the still powerful army and internal police, Fuerza de Seguridad Publica (FUSEP), in the new democratic system. The Auxiliary Bishop of Tegucigalpa reported he has no personal knowledge of widespread disappearances, though, of course, he knows of reports in the press. He acknowledged that there has been a hardening of attitudes and a growing fear that there will be disappearances. The attitude depends very much on the person who is in authority in local areas, the sergeants. He recognized that there are activities in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula that are associated with and reactions to both Salvadoran guerrilla movement and political tension with Nicaragua.

I received no reports contradicting this statement. Labor leaders, liberal deputies and military officers and university officials all agreed that brutalities occur, especially in the rural areas where unsophisticated local sergeants represent all authority. Of greater concern is increased police harassment in urban areas that has accompanied the rise of terrorist activities. Several individuals expressed concern that such actions against the moderate left would result in a dragnet and leave only the extreme left in a polarized society. One is left uncertain that Honduran officials are sufficiently aware of this danger and concerned that the chief advisers to Honduras on police matters seem to be Argentinians whose human rights record does not inspire confidence.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The most serious political problems facing Honduras at present are those associated with building democratic institutions where none existed before in the midst of a stepped-up campaign of leftist terrorism and a stagnant economic picture. In November 1981, Honduras elected a civilian President in open and fair elections. Nearly 81 percent of the eligible electorate turned out to give the Liberal Party candidate, Roberto Suazo Córdova, 55 percent of the vote. The event marked the second time in 50 years that the Liberal Party would control the presidency in Honduras. Most observers regarded the elections as a reaffirmation of the general will to return to civilian government in Honduras, which has been ruled by self-perpetuating military leaders almost continually for 18 years. It was moreover, an important signal that the civilians would have to change the ways of government. The Liberal Party received an unprecedented 150,000 plurality over its rival National Party, which had been closely associated with the succession of previous military governments.

Honduras had elected a Constituent Assembly in April 1980, and a Congress in 1981. The legislature is also controlled by the Liberal Party, which holds 44 of the 82 seats. The National Party holds 34 seats, the Party of Innovation and Unity (PINU) three seats, and the Christian Democratic Party one seat.

There remains a certain euphoria about the return to democratic institutions that provides the government with some political time and space within which to maneuver, but that also increases popular expectations about the rewards of the new system. The most serious problem confronting the political leadership today is that there are no rewards to pass around.

As a result of virtual domination of political institutions by the military and the National Party for 18 years, Honduras is in dire need of building traditions of democratic dialogue. The congress had not met for 4 years when the Constituent Assembly was elected in 1980. The congress has operated with remarkable aplomb, nevertheless. In 1980 the Assembly adopted new, higher, tariff regulations. In April 1981 the legislature imposed even stricter (10 percent ad valorem) tariffs. In December 1981 and January 1982 the Congress adopted a new sales and income tax package. The new tax increases which, given the distribution of income, will impact most heavily on the middle and upper classes, were enacted prior to the inauguration of the new President so that his administration wouldn't have to bear that burden so soon. In April 1982, in the midst of an aircraft hijacking incident, the Congress voted a strong anti-terrorist law that contemplates maximum penalties for terrorists, hijackers and arms traffickers.

Congressmen and jurists with whom I spoke all recognized the need to "modernize" and "revitalize" the political and legal institutions in the country, but recognized that this will be a slow process. As is the case in El Salvador, the legal system was never intended to handle the politically motivated crimes or cases of corruption by members of elite classes that confront the system today. The military justice system operates independently of the civilian system, which tends to insulate military officers from penalties they would impose on others.

The military is still the strongest institution in the country, and it is clear that not all citizens have lost the habit of addressing the military as government. Nevertheless, there is a conscious effort on the part of the military establishment to give the civilian government the lead. General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, Chief of the Armed Forces, in private conversation addressed this issue specifically, insisting that he considered his position as commander of the armed forces to be subordinate to that of the president. While he is elected by the congress from a list presented by the armed forces and therefore holds a special position within the cabinet, he considered himself nevertheless subordinate to the president. In one situation during the National Security Seminar, a civilian political leader proposed that Álvarez undertake a specific action (relating to the press). The General reminded the proposer that the initiative belonged to the executive and the legislature, not to the military. Throughout the Seminar, General Álvarez encouraged (at one point ordered) mixing and open dialogue between civilians and military. The relationship was clearly new for both, but there seemed to be a firm commitment to continue the dialogue.

There are some divisions within the military though Álvarez enjoys broad, strong support from senior and junior officers. Álvarez is direct and hardnosed. He is given high marks within his own institution for professionalism and for professionalizing the armed forces. He is said not to tolerate the corruption and payola that have long characterized Honduran civil-military relations and generally has succeeded in imposing these standards on the system. He has forced a number of senior officers out of positions of lucre, and some of the current attacks on him may be seen to stem from these actions. Álvarez' two rivals for his present position, Col. Leonidas Torres Árias and Col. Hubert Bodden Cáceres, were both sent abroad to distant embassies. Torres Árias has lodged charges against Álvarez that he is pushing Honduras toward a campaign against Nicaragua. The charges were immediately denied by Honduras, and Torres Árias, a former head of military intelligence, was discharged dishonorably by the High Command for damaging the prestige and interests of the army.

More important than the charges lodged by Torres Árias are concerns that Álvarez may be coming isolated by his own bureaucracy from the views of younger officers, many of whom may advocate a less antagonistic and vocal line in regional politics as well as more liberal military and police policies at home. There is some concern that Argentine officers and trainers and intelligence specialists have undue clout with senior elements of the Honduran military establishment. While the number is not known, it was rumored that as many as 50 to 70 Argentines were or had been present in

Honduras working at all levels of the armed forces. It has been suggested that the Argentine presence was much greater during the Galtieri presidency in Argentina (December 1981-June 1982). In December 1982 Argentina said it would no longer support military trainers in Honduras.

Also worrisome is the concern, offered by some, that there remain decisions on which the military may act independently without consulting with or having the prior consent of the President. While this concern stems in part from the long habit of military autonomy in the country, the extent to which it prevails is a sign of the fragility of the democratic system.

Honduras enjoys a vocal political opposition which has access to a free and open press. Besides the two major parties, the Liberal and the National Parties, a small liberal businessmen's party, the Party of Innovation and Unity, is the third largest with three seats in the legislature. A small Christian Democratic party is active. The Honduran Communist Party is small and ineffectual to date. A Revolutionary Party and a Socialist Party are also organized, but without much support in the electorate. Both parties and press are increasingly critical of the government, which after nearly a year in office has been able to do little to provide better conditions of living for the population. The government's energies have rather been focused on coping with regional political troubles, severe economic problems and, more recently, a rising trend of terrorist incidents.

All sectors are disappointed at the level of assistance that has been forthcoming from the United States, other bilateral donors and the multilateral institutions. More assistance may be forthcoming now that Honduras has reached agreement with the IMF, and the United States will be in a better position to argue for bilateral economic assistance from European donors now that the Caribbean Basin Initiative aid program has been signed and a U.S. contribution is in place. Nevertheless, Hondurans have not come to terms completely with the fact that they must endure severe austerity for several years to come. The burden this places on a newly-elected democratic government which has had to raise taxes and fees for public services, and which is hoping to be able to force private sector owners to bear the burden of their own bad debts, is tremendous.

Political relations with other important opinion leaders in the civilian sector have been slow in emerging. In contrast to the pattern in most of Latin America, the present Honduran Government generally enjoys the support of the faculty and students of the major university, the Autonomous National University of Honduras (UNAH). The university was controlled by leftist tendencies under previous governments, but in May 1982, students and faculty voted a conservative member of the National Party into office as Chancellor of the University. Observers noted that leftists had maintained control of the institution largely because the student body failed to participate in annual elections of the governing board (which appoints department heads and approves curriculum). In 1982, conservative political leaders mobilized broad student support for the change.

Relations between the government and the church, especially younger members of the church, are not close. A senior church official suggested that the Honduran church had been torn by conflicting political views and that there had been an effort to radicalize the church, but he believed that this tendency had passed and that there were many bases on which the church and government (civil and military) could work together. As yet, however, church and government were not in close communication. Church officials recognized that this was in part the consequence of the church's intense focus on the plight of the rural poor following Vatican II and, more importantly, following the 1969 conference of Latin American Bishops in Medellin. Officials acknowledged that members of the church had taken political positions and sought to use the church for political purposes, but argued that such practice had stopped.

One church official lamented that tensions between church and authorities were serious and perhaps becoming more serious over time. Church and government authorities take different positions on the questions of refugees, he said. The church believes the government and particularly the armed forces are not paying sufficient attention to problems in this area. While the individual had no personal knowledge of disappearances, he believes that attitudes within the armed forces about critics of the government were hardening, and indiscriminate actions against critics of the government could become a serious problem. In contrast, he said many church officials shared the concern that the country is increasingly the target of subversion and that the population is increasingly being submitted to a barrage of propaganda from radio broadcasting from Cuba and Nicaragua. A Honduran or alternative message is not being presented. The churchman regarded this as potentially very dangerous for the country.

In their October pastoral letter, Honduran bishops sharply criticized left and right for contributing to uncertainty and fear in the country because of their violent tactics; criticized political party leaders for putting the interests of party before those of country, strongly criticized the organization of rural civil defense committees as likely to contribute to polarization and increased violence in the country, and in general recognized the current state of democratic political stability as very precarious. They urged commitment of all elements in the country to work to strengthen democratic institutions.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

Honduras is currently experiencing very difficult economic conditions. It is the second poorest country in the Hemisphere. Growth has been stagnant for the last 3 years, and the outlook for the next several years is not encouraging. Per capita income (constant 1981 prices) has declined from \$708 in 1979 to \$648 in 1982. Overall investment fell from 29 percent of GNP in 1979 to 24 percent in 1981. Two-thirds of the population are rural peasants whose per capita income may not exceed \$100 annually. Population is growing at 3.5 percent annually, one of the highest rates in the world. Though Honduras is sparsely populated, only about 25 percent of the land in the mountainous country is arable, much of that on mountain slopes.

The principal factors affecting the economy have been (1) high petroleum import costs since 1974, (2) recent (1980 and 1981) sharp drops in the volume and/or value of major export commodities—bananas, coffee and sugar, and (3) capital flight that has been induced by regional instability. In recent years coffee income has fallen sharply (15 percent in 1981) because of low world prices. Lost income was partly made up by strong sugar earnings in 1981 when sugar exports expanded by 55 percent over 1980 because of recently added refining capacity. In the present year, however, prices for all Honduras' commodity exports are down.

The depressed state of commodity prices and export reductions stemming from unfavorable quotas impacts Honduras especially severely. The country grew at an unusually high rate in the mid-1970's and during that time made major expansions in coffee and sugar production. The historical time series on which current quotas are based penalizes the country because of its very recent expansion.

Honduras is currently able to export 110,000 metric tons of sugar to the United States (its only market). Honduras' quota of 1 percent of U.S. imports will permit it to sell approximately 28,000 metric tons in the U.S. market in the current year.¹ Honduras also suffered a blow in coffee export prospects when it was given a quota by the London-based International Coffee Agreement that is 17 percent below its previous year's export level. This will mean a loss of from \$20-\$25 million in export earnings over the next year. If Honduras is not able to increase exports in these two areas, its balance-of-payments situation will deteriorate sharply and it may not be able to meet its IMF stabilization targets.

¹ Hondurans are especially resentful that the quota for Nicaragua is 2.4 percent of U.S. imports. This imbalance contributes to a perception that the United States is not prepared to help Honduras out of the present crisis.

The second major factor contributing to the bleak trade balance has been Honduras' dependency on petroleum imports. Petroleum imports account for about 17 percent of all Honduras' imports and the costs have risen 2.5 times since the late 1970's. Honduras just began to participate in the Mexico-Venezuela Oil Facility in September 1982, under an agreement that will allow it to purchase all its quota from Venezuela, whose lighter crude Honduras is able to refine in its domestic refinery. In the long term, however, the country should be an exporter of hydroelectric power when its El Cajon hydroelectric project comes on stream in 1985.

The final contributor to the difficult economic situation has been capital flight that has occurred over the past 3 years. Much of the capital flight has been the result of regional political instability. In addition, Honduras' liberal exchange regulations permitted individuals from other Central American countries to buy dollars in Honduras, which they in turn moved abroad. Administrative measures were adopted in 1981 to reduce some of this abuse. It is thought that some \$500 million in funds were removed from the country after legislative elections in 1980, in anticipation of the new government's intention to crack down on corruption. Suazo Córdova's platform of pursuing corruption has been only modestly implemented.

Currently, the Honduran public sector debt stands at \$1.5 billion; debt to private commercial banks (mostly U.S. banks) is about 25 percent of that total. The government has been obliged to assume the debts of several autonomous state enterprises, increasing its own burden. In March President Suazo Córdova promised that the country will pay every cent of its debt.

Honduras signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF for \$104 million in November 1982. The agreement, which has been under discussion for some time, requires Honduras to undertake a rigorous austerity program. Among the measures that have been implemented in this program are—

- A 10 percent reduction in 1982 of current government expenditures (this has been accomplished by laying off hundreds of employees in the government and autonomous state industries);
- Containment of government spending increases within fixed targets;
- A 2 percent increase in the sales tax;
- Increase in income tax rates, especially for, higher income levels;
- A 10 percent addition to *ad valorem* tariffs on all imports except some critical raw materials;
- A reduction of 1983 public credit to one-third of the 1982 level;
- An examination of the performance and efficiency of autonomous enterprises; and
- A commitment to raise the charges for public services.

The future holds promise. In 1985/86, the important Inter-American Development Bank-World Bank-financed hydroelectric plant, El Cajon, will come on stream. Production will cover all of the country's electricity needs and sharply reduce oil import bills. A major pulp and paper company has been launched with Inter-American Development Bond financing (\$28 million) to exploit

Honduras' tremendous forestry potential. The project should begin producing income this year. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are all involved in the development of the rich Aguan Valley in northern Honduras.

The principal difficulty in getting the economy moving is the continued shortage of investment capital due to high interest rates, investor uncertainty resulting from political conditions in the region, and the demise of regional marketing opportunities that have also occurred because of the instability. In addition, Honduras has a very thin layer of skilled managerial and technical manpower. Until the basic level of education in the country is improved (literacy is 50 percent), this will continue to be a serious drag on the country's growth potential.

U.S. ASSISTANCE

Table 1 shows U.S. economic assistance levels to Honduras over the past 4 years and proposals for next year.

TABLE 1.—U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO HONDURAS, 1979-83

	[In millions of dollars]				
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 ¹
Development assistance.....	22.0	45.8	25.6	31.3	29.0
Public Law 480, Title I and III.....	2.0	2.0	3.6	7.0	5.0
Title II.....	2.8	3.2	4.6	4.2	4.0
Housing investment guarantees.....		0	15.0	10.0	
Peace Corps.....	2.1	1.9	2.4	2.7	2.7
Narcotics.....	.1				
Economic support funds.....				² 36.3	25.0
Total ³	29.0	52.9	47.3	87.0	63.0

¹ Projected.

² Caribbean Basin Initiative = 35.0; Tegucigalpa Power Restoration = 1.3.

³ Total does not include Peace Corps.

There is a consensus among civilian and military authorities that economic problems are the most serious problems that Honduras faces. While Honduras is grateful for assistance it has received, some Hondurans have expressed frustration that resource support from the international community is so low when the country's problems are greater than in earlier "fat" years like 1980, when there was a military government. They compare levels of assistance to El Salvador or to Costa Rica and believe the United States does not appreciate the severity of current Honduran economic problems. Development assistance funding in 1983 should resolve some of these complaints, but without massive concessional assistance and a sharp turnaround in commodity prices and the world economy in general, Honduras faces a number of lean years.

Funds obligated to Honduras under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (\$35 million) have provided balance-of-payments relief this year. The country's current account deficit stands at \$398 million for 1982. Of this, \$277 million will be provided by multilateral agencies and \$28 million by bilateral donors other than the United States. The United States Caribbean Basin contribution was an es-

sential component in financial planning that led to the \$104 million IMF stand-by. Honduras still faces an estimated \$59 million balance-of-payments gap this year.

THE SECURITY CLIMATE IN HONDURAS

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY THREATS

Honduras currently assesses threats to its own national integrity to come from two sources—first, a mounting level of internal subversive and terrorist activity, and second, dramatic arms buildup on its borders. Honduras blames the Nicaraguan Sandinistas for both promoting and infiltrating subversion in the country and for the most direct threat along the border. Nicaragua's acquisition of Soviet T-55 tanks, its development of airfields in remote northern and eastern areas of the country, the prospects that Nicaragua will acquire MIGs of an as yet unknown designation, as well as Nicaraguan incursions into Honduran territory, its attacks on commercial fishing vessels in Honduran waters and Nicaragua's opening of a once-resolved border dispute have also raised concern.²

Hondurans are also uneasy at the evolving situation in El Salvador. They see almost any outcome of the current conflict presenting a problem for them. If the left should win, Honduras will feel surrounded by hostile neighbors in El Salvador and Nicaragua. If the current Salvadoran Government should consolidate itself and crush the guerrilla movement, Honduras would rest uneasy at the presence of an unusually well-trained and well-equipped Salvadoran army on its long-disputed border. Salvadoran Government foot-dragging in efforts to reach agreement on the border definition does not help dispel this latent uneasiness.

The perception that Nicaragua is the principal source of threat to both the territorial integrity of Honduras and to the prospects for its fledgling democratic experiment are shared by military and civilian leaders alike. Both the armed forces Chief General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez and President Roberto Suazo Córdova speak on this subject with equal ardor. There appear to be no differences in the assessment of security threats between civilian leaders and the military. There are disagreements among both groups as to whether U.S. policy in the region does not exacerbate Honduras' problems with Nicaragua.

Political tensions have been increasing in Honduras over the past year because of increasing violence related to the region-wide political instability. The present Honduran Government, which took office in January 1982, changed the country's posture with respect to on-going guerrilla wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. While the previous government had tolerated use of Honduran territory for transshipment of arms and supplies to guerrillas in both

² Honduras documents 39 cases in which it claims Nicaraguan military forces have violated the border.

countries, the present government has declared that it will not permit such activities. As a result, security along the major roads leading through Honduras between Nicaragua and El Salvador has been tightened, curtailing the overland shipment of materiel. There have been raids on leftist "safe houses"³ in Honduras, and substantial stores of arms and ammunition have been captured. Police activities against known leftists have increased with some negative results for the overall human rights record. In June 1982 the Honduran army engaged in a coordinated effort with the Salvadoran army to clean out the *bolson*⁴ areas along the Salvadoran and Honduran border, and there is greater sharing of intelligence between the two governments now than previously.

The Hondurans account for the recent increase in subversive activity within the country as retaliation by the leftists for depriving them of the sanctuary of Honduran territory. The feeling that "they are turning on us now" is widespread throughout many sectors of Honduran society with which I talked. The urgency of the present situation is felt more intensely as a result. Hondurans realize that the present international economic climate does not favor early economic recovery in the country and that this makes it more difficult to prove to the general population that the democratic system can work for it. At the same time, many fear that the rising level of terrorist activities will provoke greater repression on the part of police elements. Most Hondurans recognize that this would be counterproductive.

In general, there seems to be a consensus that subversion is the most pressing security problem confronting the country and that attention must be given to developing proper policies for dealing with it. However, the possibility of a military action by Nicaragua against Honduras is not discounted and contingency plans are being developed.

A number of events have contributed to create the climate of distrust that presently exists between Honduras and Nicaragua. These include problems along the 500-mile border between the two countries, recent Nicaraguan claims to Honduran territory in the remote Mosquitia region, and what Hondurans perceive have been Nicaragua's dilatory tactics in dealing with peace proposals advanced by Honduras. Honduras has documented at least 35 instances between January 1 and August 21, 1982, in which it claims Nicaraguan forces have violated Honduran territory.

NICARAGUAN REFUGEES ON THE BORDER

The border area presents difficult military and diplomatic problems for both sides. Honduras provided sanctuary to Sandinista revolutionaries during the war against Somoza (as did Costa Rica), and when Somoza fell, about 3,000 Nicaraguan national guardsmen

³ Honduran authorities have cracked 12 "safe houses" in the past year, six of these in the past 3 months. The safe houses have yielded handguns, rifles, submachine guns, grenades, ammunition and materials for building bombs.

⁴ The *bolson* (large pocket) areas are those border regions for which Honduras and El Salvador are still in disagreement on boundary definitions. Under agreement reached in 1980, military forces of neither country can enter these pockets along the common border. Hondurans maintain that El Salvador has not reached agreement on the boundary because any division of the *bolsones* will represent a retreat from its claim to all the disputed territory. The U.S. Government is pressing both parties for a resolution.

and other Somoza sympathizers sought refuge on the Honduras side of the border. Some of these were national guardsmen who set up camps on the border with the intention of carrying the revolution back to Nicaragua. Honduras tolerated these refugees at the time, and indeed could probably have done little to prevent their coming or to effect their removal. Initially Nicaragua complained of Honduras tolerating the Somocistas in their territory. In the past year, however, there have been increasing allegations that the Honduran military has been aiding and channelling supplies to these counterrevolutionaries. Honduras officially denies that this is the case. More recently there have been allegations that the United States has been aiding the counterrevolutionaries.

The Nicaraguan refugee problem poses a serious dilemma for the Hondurans who recognize that the refugees, on the border are an irritant to the Sandinista government in Managua. Honduras has proposed (perhaps not entirely seriously) that other countries offer asylum to the refugees, and more recently (September 1982) has solicited the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to grant refugee status to the Nicaraguans coming over the border. Whether or not elements of the Honduran military are aiding and abetting counterrevolutionary operations against Nicaragua at present, it would nevertheless be extremely difficult and costly to try to remove these people from the border region, which is extremely rugged, remote and poorly served by roads or other communication.

BOUNDARY DIFFICULTIES WITH NICARAGUA

Until the July 1982 transfer of an army battalion to Mocoron in Gracias a Dios Department, the Honduran army maintained only 500 men on the border as patrol. The border patrols are deployed for the most part in small outposts of five to eight men each, and there is no communications net linking them either to their own battalion headquarters or to central headquarters in the capital. This has been especially true in the eastern provinces, which could only be reached from the capital by air or sea for there is no all-weather road from Tegucigalpa. Hondurans justify the recent removal of the 5th Battalion from Comayagua to Mocoron as an effort to better secure their own territory. A similar move to upgrade naval presence at Puerto Lempira is in process. Honduran naval vessels have not been able to stay on station at Puerto Lempira because there has been no fuel storage facility there. Thus, the navy, stationed at Puerto Cortez, had to steam some 20 hours in order to maintain a brief presence on the eastern coast. The need for a greater presence has been indicated by recent disputes with Nicaragua over the definition of the maritime boundary in the region. Traditionally, the two countries have regarded the 15th parallel as the boundary. However, recently Nicaragua has sought to reassert a claim to territory between the Coco River (15° N. Lat.) and the Patuca River further north. In doing so, Nicaragua has challenged the 1906 arbitration by the King of Spain, which settled the Honduras/Nicaraguan border at the Coco River. Nicaragua did not officially accept that award, though it has been upheld by two

subsequent decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Peace Commission.

Given this background, Hondurans regard recent maritime incidents in the boundary region as hostile challenges from Nicaragua. On September 15 Nicaraguan gun boats fired on and took possession of two Honduran fishing boats off Puerto Lempira. A Honduran naval vessel challenged the action and was fired upon by the Nicaraguans. Nicaragua has also protested Honduran incursions into Nicaraguan territorial waters. In response to the increasing tension in this area, the Honduran navy has recently acquired a retired U.S. Coast Guard buoy tender, the *Walnut*, which can hold 40,000 gallons of fuel and will be moored off the northeast coast between Puerto Castillo and Puerto Lempira, enabling Honduran vessels to remain on station in the east for much longer periods of time. In addition, Honduras is considering deepening the present 7-foot draft channel into the Caratasca Lagoon to permit naval vessels to port at Puerto Lempira.

HONDURAN PEACE PROPOSALS

On several occasions beginning in March 1982 at an OAS meeting, Honduras has made proposals for resolving regional tensions to Nicaragua to which it feels Nicaragua has not responded seriously. There are six basic points to the Honduran proposals:

- (1) To set up immediately a framework for regional disarmament;
- (2) To agree to reduction of foreign advisors, military and other;
- (3) To design mechanisms to observe fulfillment of these commitments;
- (4) To agree upon mechanisms for stopping arms traffic in the region;
- (5) To maintain respect for delimited borders and traditional boundaries; and
- (6) To outline the parameters of a permanent, multilateral regional dialogue.

When asked whether it would not be useful to accept Venezuelan or Mexican good offices to help resolve differences with Nicaragua, Honduran officials stressed the need to resolve a regional, not a bilateral, problem. A number of officials questioned the utility of negotiating with the Nicaraguans in what they regarded as a climate of duplicity. One individual protested: Why should we negotiate with the Nicaraguans? They make these positive noises, but continue building tunnels under our borders. Another charged: The Nicaraguans negotiate with their fist behind their back. They can't be trusted. No matter what they say for public consumption, they continue to back subversives.

In part because of their own strategic position between Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, the Hondurans with whom I spoke were strongly supportive of a regional approach to the political tension in Central America. Senior officers in the Honduran Government expressed enthusiasm for a regional initiative of democratic governments that would be charged with seeking resolution of differences among governments in the region. They regard the initiative as Honduras' own and noted that discussions had been underway for a time with Costa Rica on this initiative

and that ministers would be meeting shortly.⁵ What they described was similar to a framework that emerged from the Costa Rican meeting of democratic governments on October 4, 1982. The Hondurans were politely critical of the U.S. proposed Central American democratic community, which had been structured with two governments that were then not freely elected—Honduras' own and El Salvador—but they were firm in their support for the idea of community and cooperation among the aspiring democratic nations in the region. They expressed the hope that these regional parties could find their own solution to regional problems and that the United States would not be seen to be leading the process.

MILITARY READINESS

Honduran efforts to upgrade their military capabilities are limited by lack of funds, low absorptive capacity, and a relatively sober assessment of the country's long-term ability to sustain either a major armed force or a major war in the region. Three days of intense seminar with top-ranking officers and subsequent contacts left one with a sense of the high emotion in the armed forces about the regional security situation, but also a sense that they have their feet on the ground.

TABLE 2.—ORDER OF BATTLE OF HONDURAN DEFENSE FORCES

Army (11,500)	Navy (300)	Air Force (1,200)	Paramilitary
Organization:			
1 armored car regiment		1 attack fighter squadron	4,000 national police (FUSEP).
11 infantry battalions		1 counterinsurgency squadron	
3 artillery battalions		1 reconnaissance squadron	
1 engineering battalion		1 liaison squadron	
1 special forces unit		1 training squadron	
Equipment:			
17 Scorpion light tanks	6 Swift patrol craft	12 Super Mystere B-2	
12 M-116 75 mm pack	2 105-foot fast patrol boats	4 F-86 Sabre, 5 A-37s	
12 M-101 105 mm howitzer	4 65-foot coastal patrols	3 RT-33A	
81 120 mm mortar	1 Bowe tender	2 Cessna 180, 2 185	
57 mm recoilless guns		6 T-6; 24 T-28F; 5 T-41A	
On order: 105 mm howitzers.	On order: 1 Swift 105-foot patrol craft	Helicopters: 2 UH 19D	
		10 UH1H	
		Transports: 2 C-54; 2 C-45; 1	
		C-47; 3 Arava; 1 Westwind	
		On order: 6 A-37B, T-37B	

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 1982/1983" (London: 1982).

The Honduran Armed Forces presently consist of 11,500 army, 300 navy, and 1,200 air force personnel and 4,000 national police. Table 2 describes the order of battle of the Honduran forces. The overall assessment of the forces is that they are very well prepared when compared to other Central American armies. The small air force receives especially high praise. However, all services suffer

⁵ President Suazo Córdova referred to this initiative in his September 16, 1982, response to the Mexican and Venezuelan Presidents' offers of good office to Honduras and Nicaragua. The meeting took place on October 4, in San Jose, Costa Rica, with Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Dominican Republic attending. A 10 point proposal was drafted to be carried by Foreign Minister Fernando Volio of Costa Rica to other governments in the region.

from lack of adequate training and training facilities, as well as lack of ammunition, spare parts and fuel supplies.

No one believes that Honduras is ripe for the kind of guerrilla war currently seen in El Salvador or Guatemala. Therefore, the principal internal defense efforts are targeted against (1) terrorism and subversion, areas covered by the police force, the Fuerza de Seguridad Publica or FUSEP, which was integrated into the army as a separate branch in 1973,⁶ and (2) defense against a possible invasion from Nicaragua. Honduras has invested in some training of its police officers. Some have attended school abroad—principally in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, but also in Panama, the United States and other countries. Several U.S. officials lamented that U.S. funds could not be used for police training because this is a critical area, given the growing internal violence. Other observers commented that the police are learning to deal more professionally with investigations, the cracking of safe houses and the capture of prisoners.

U.S. officials with whom I spoke stated that Honduras is being advised to prepare principally for prolonged terrorist and guerrilla warfare, not for land or air war against Nicaragua. The U.S. military advisory effort seems to be placing emphasis on upgrading present capabilities, including logistics, planning, communications, general security and so forth. Recent Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) have focussed on these areas.⁷ For example, there has been an MTT logistics survey team; an airfield security training team, which spent one month at each air base; a helicopter instructor pilot training team to train instructors so that Honduras could train its own helicopter pilots; a naval maintenance MTT; and an MTT that helped set up a command and general staff college which Honduras inaugurated last year. This effort will save Honduras considerable money by allowing it to train most officers at home and send only the best abroad. The current staff of Hondurans is highly regarded and has been trained in some of the best military institutions in the United States, Latin America and Europe. Future programs for upgrading the military include developing communications linkages between bases and services, upgrading stocks of ammunition and parts, and acquisition of new aircraft and helicopters. Honduras will shortly make a decision to purchase a new trainer aircraft to replace their pre-Korean-war vintage T-28s. They appear to be deciding for the Spanish Casa-101, which is appealing for its fuel efficiency. Honduras is also discussing acquisition of a radar system, which would permit it to cover all three

⁶A number of army officers regarded this as a negative. FUSEP, and especially some regional commanders and sergeants are regarded as a brutal and unsavory lot. Their behavior, especially in the interior, reflects on the army, one officer noted, and leaves a bad impression. There is widespread recognition that FUSEP needs to upgrade the quality of its personnel and training. It is likely the greatest attention in this area will go to the urban zones of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, which have seen the greatest amount of urban terrorism lately.

⁷In fiscal year 1982, 21 different Mobile Training Teams (and about 112 trainers in all) were sent to Honduras. The average number of U.S. military personnel in country at any one time over the past year averaged 34-45 per month, according to records shown me. The highest figures were 106 in spring 1982 when several programs were overlapping and 96 in August when the United States was involved in moving the 5th Battalion from Comayagua to Mocerón in the east of the country, an effort that also involved two U.S. C-130 transport aircraft, two Chinook helicopters and two UH-1H (Huey) helicopters, engaging in 40 sorties over 10 flying days to transfer men and material. MTT subjects have covered communications, maintenance aviation skills, small unit operations, personnel administration, airborne operations and logistics. There were about 50 trainers in country at the time of the study mission.

border areas, airport landing and air route traffic control electronics equipment. Honduras currently has 19 active combat aircraft, 14 Super Mystere bought third-hand from Israel in 1977, and five U.S. A-37s. Six additional A-37s will begin arriving under fiscal year 1982 supplemental FMS grant assistance. Honduras has recently been discussing possible additional military equipment purchases from Israel.

Honduras has shopped for weapons in Europe, Israel and South America, but is very limited in what it can buy by lack of cash. The defense budget presently runs at about \$60 million, half of which is used to pay salaries and another 30 percent of which is spent on fixed costs. The remainder is insufficient to engage in large-scale purchases or indeed to make emergency purchases of parts and ammunition should an emergency occur. General Alvarez noted in several conversations that the defense budget has remained constant over the past 3 years. The country has 28 helicopters, 10 of which are on loan from the United States until 1985. The remainder were purchased in 1981 and 1982. The air force consists of approximately 1,200 men, including 60 pilots. About 90 percent of the pilots are trained in the United States, and there is obviously close feeling for this country as a result. Maintenance of existing aircraft is excellent, such that 10 of 14 Super Mysteres and four of five A-37s are generally operable at a time, a very good record given the age of the craft, particularly the Super Mysteres. Maintenance of the latter aircraft poses serious problems. The Hondurans have never invested in a parts stockpile, and therefore have tended to shop piecemeal for spares as they are needed. Lack of spare parts would affect Honduras' staying power in a conflict more severely than any other factor.

A number of Honduran officers have expressed a desire to acquire F5-Es from the United States, but both U.S. MilGroup personnel and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force indicated that this was not an order of priority at present, though it might be at a future date. In general the Hondurans felt prepared to meet any threat posed by a possible Nicaraguan air force composed of MIG-17s or 19s. If more advanced MIGs were available to the Nicaraguans, the Hondurans could be outmaneuvered, though in general the Honduran air force is expected to perform better than a Nicaraguan force that would only recently have been trained.

The Honduran navy was created in 1973 and consists of a limited number of ships, largely fast patrol boats. The inventory currently consists of three 105-foot and five 65-foot such craft. Because of the shallow draft of the channel at Puerto Lempira, all units of the navy must port at Puerto Cortes in the extreme northwest of the country. Honduras also plans a military facility as part of the commercial port development at Puerto Castilla. Facilities would include an airfield and piers for naval vessels.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO HONDURAS

Total U.S. military assistance to Honduras in fiscal year 1982 is \$31.3 million, of which \$10 million is supplemental assistance voted by Congress in August 1982, and \$10 million is reprogrammed FMS credits. This compares with \$9.1 million in military assistance

in 1981. A total of \$15.3 million is being requested for 1983. Table 3 gives a breakdown of U.S. security assistance to Honduras for fiscal years 1980-83. Assistance levels doubled from fiscal year 1981-82, and 1982 levels tripled with the \$10 million supplemental request. The strong emphasis has been on upgrading Honduran air force capabilities through acquisition of new aircraft (six A-37s), spare parts and ammunition stockpiles.

TABLE 3.—U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO HONDURAS, FISCAL YEARS 1980-83

[In thousands of dollars]

	1980	1981	1982	1982 supplemen- tal	1983
A. Security Assistance Program					
Foreign military sales (FMS):					
Direct credits			1,000	20,000	9,000
Guarantees	3,530	8,400	9,000		5,500
Military education and training (IMET)	438	535	1,275		800
Total assistance	3,968	8,935	11,275	20,000	15,300
B. Deliveries					
Ammunition	422	¹ 2,784	14	7,000	6,000
Supply/support	361	1,050	268	800	2,600
Spare parts	631	254	664	4,000	500
Communications	394	5		⁵ 3,200	750
Air Force	2,861	² 213	³ 7,229	³ 4,000	
Army			⁴ 900		
Navy			115	⁶ 1,000	
Total deliveries	4,669	4,306	9,190	20,000	9,850

¹ Includes weapons (small arms, M-16s, M-79s).² Includes aircraft components, technical assistance.³ A-37s and associated spare parts package.⁴ Includes four helicopters, automotive spare parts, extra engines, and other items.⁵ Includes purchase of radios, repair and survey of needs.⁶ Repair and overhaul of existing patrol boats.

Source: Defense Security Assistance Agency.

In addition to FMS and IMET requests, Congress voted \$13 million in military construction funds for enhancement of airport runways at Palmeroa Air Academy at Comayagua and at Golason Airfield at La Cieba.⁸ This represents an \$8 million cut from the Administration request and will represent an even more substantial cut to the Hondurans, which already saw \$3.5 million of the initial \$21 million request channeled to meet overhead costs of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. prime contractors. The U.S. military construction funds are intended for extensions of runways, building a second access ramp to the runway, for revetment structures and additional fuel storage facilities. While the runway extensions and improvements to the runways are intended to permit these to conform to U.S. Air Force specifications and will permit greater U.S. use of the fields under the terms of a 1954 bilateral military assistance agreement, the runway improvements, and

⁸ Originally the military construction request provided for \$21 million for the Honduras project. Three airfields would have been affected—Palmeroa, Golason and La Mesa. With the reduction of funds to \$13 million, the Golason component will be postponed. The La Mesa project was dropped from consideration earlier because of the inability to provide physical security for aircraft.

more importantly the development of second access ramps, revetments and fuel storage facilities, fall within the scope of priority development for the Honduran air force as well. At present, Honduras does not have any revetments for its fighter force, and the existence of only one access ramp theoretically would permit the destruction of a single plane on the ramp to impede the take-off of the rest of the Honduran air force. We were able to visit two of the three fields. Work on both is well underway, with Honduran contractors performing the grading of runway extensions. The Honduran engineer supervising the project has identified a good number of areas in which savings can be realized. Following the cutting of the military construction request from \$21 to \$13 million, runway improvements and ramp development will continue at Palmeroa.

In discussing the airfield construction project with Honduran authorities, it was made clear that there was opposition to the program in the U.S. Congress. It is unlikely that the Hondurans expected the program to be cut at the last minute, however. The Hondurans expressed perplexity at the nature of opposition to the program. It was explained that many Senators and Congressmen felt that the airfield construction program represented a particularly hostile signal from the United States to Nicaragua, perhaps an indication that the United States was not interested in seeking peaceful relations with that country. Moreover, many felt that the airfields left open the door for eventual U.S. direct military action in Central America, which was opposed by Congress and by the American public, according to opinion polls taken over the past year. Both United States and Honduran officials were quick to assure that no U.S. military personnel would be stationed at these fields and that, moreover, U.S. aircraft would only use the bases en route between other bases (e.g., Puerto Rico and Panama), or in special circumstances. In addition, President Suazo reiterated that Hondurans would hold to the requirement of the 1954 agreement for prior authorization of use by the Hondurans.

With respect to the negative signal to Nicaragua, the Hondurans firmly believed that the threat was to them from Nicaragua, not vice versa. In one heated discussion during the National Security Seminar, one officer, commenting on a recent remark by Secretary of Defense Weinberger that the United States had no intention of sending troops to Central America at the present time, observed "We do not want American troops in our country. We do want your assistance so that we can defend our own country. If we do not get training and equipment we need now, when our options are many, you may recognize the need when it is too late." Another said, "We are not asking for troops, but we can imagine scenarios in which they might be needed, and then what? This option should not be foreclosed." General Álvarez commented in a similar vein that the Honduran military budget would remain constant—as it had the last year, except for increases to cover higher costs of fuel and other fixed items. "I think we are able," he said, "but we do not have the resources to do the job that needs to be done to insure the security of the country. Internally, we can guarantee the country's security, but the problem is the external threat. If we were invaded by Nicaragua, we could probably stop them, but for how

long could we hold them and against what; that is the question . . ."

Over the course of the National Security Seminar and in subsequent conversations with General Álvarez, President Suazo Córdova and other leaders, the Hondurans had ample opportunity to express exasperation with U.S. policy toward their country and toward the region. In part, Honduran expectations had been raised by strong U.S. language in support of democratic alternatives and the strong and positive language with which President Reagan announced the Caribbean Basin Initiative. During the weeks prior to the Honduran elections of November 1981, several Honduran military personnel approached U.S. authorities and "tried" the idea of postponing the elections until conditions were more propitious. The U.S. Embassy reported that such action would be received very badly in the United States and would jeopardize all hope of economic or military assistance in the coming year or years. It is possible that the Hondurans believed that the opposite might also be true; that is, if elections were held, U.S. largesse could be assured. While the Hondurans are clearly thankful for the assistance that has been forthcoming, they are also perplexed at the debate that has surrounded the programs, for this has left them uncertain as to what U.S. goals in the region are and the extent to which they can rely upon U.S. assistance in the future.

Among the comments that reflected this frustration:

You think you can treat Nicaragua like Cuba. If they will promise not to help the guerrillas, you won't bother them; but for Honduras this is not such a good solution because we would still be the target of their advancing Leninism.

We are not asking for anything, but we are looking for your help. We want to live in a democracy, and we see the decline in coffee and sugar quotas, the principal sources of income for the development that we need to undertake to create conditions propitious for development.

We asked for help in the planning of the new command school. We asked Argentina via their representative in Guatemala, and we asked the United States. Almost immediately, the Argentines sent two colonels to help in the planning of the curriculum and the sub-director of the General Staff College in Argentina to help. U.S. assistance came a year after it was requested—2 weeks ago (and a month before the school was to open for its second year). This is used as an example to say that we in Honduras are afraid that your aid may come too late.

We have a strong affection for the United States. Scholarships to Panama or to the United States are highly desired. But we have to pay to send our people to the United States, while they can go to Chile or Argentina for much less. With limited resources, we now have to buy all of the manuals we will use in the program, and we have to pay for their translation.

It is the interest [14 percent] in the FMS that is strangling us. We will pay, but we need a longer financing period and less interest. . . .

Both democracies and Communists have their intellectuals who defend the rationale for the positions to be taken. We don't see any benefits coming from our democratic friends. You are leaving us without any good arguments that democracy is the best way.

When we complain about the quotas for coffee and for sugar, it is not the figures that are the problem, but the consequences that all of these policies have for this country. . . . We are told that there is a window of 2 years in which the country will not grow, but we don't have 2 years. . . .

THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN HONDURAS

Honduras presently hosts more than 30,000 refugees from each of the three nations on its borders. A little more than half the current refugee population is Salvadoran, located in two large camps, Mesa Grande and Colomoncagua, and a smaller camp, San Antonio, near the Salvadoran border. There are another 600 Guatemalan refugees on the northern border, especially at El Tesoro refugee camp. In addition, approximately 13,000 Miskito and Sumo Indians have crossed into Honduras from Nicaragua in the past year. The Miskito Indians have traditionally lived freely in the sparsely populated border area of the two nations. When the Sandinista government in Nicaragua began a campaign in early 1982 to clear the border area of inhabitants, many left permanently for Honduras rather than be moved into unfamiliar living conditions in the south in Nicaragua. The Sumo population in Nicaragua is concentrated somewhat further from the border area. Nevertheless, a large number of Sumo Indians have fled Nicaragua from areas as far as 100 kilometers into the interior. While the refugee population along the Salvadoran border has remained fairly constant for some time, the population in the eastern Mosquitia region continues to grow at a good pace.

A new refugee population is beginning to develop in the center border area with Nicaragua. There are presently about 3,700 ethnic Nicaraguan refugees in the Danli-Las Trojes-El Paraiso border region in El Paraiso Department. The first of this group began coming over the border in January and April of 1982 and growth has been steady since then.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has responsibility for the refugee camps along the Salvadoran border and for the Miskito Indian camps. UNHCR has not taken responsibility for the Guatemalan camp because it remains too close to the border area (UNHCR regulations require that refugee camps be located approximately 50 kilometers from the border of the conflictive country). The same is true in the case of the ethnic Nicaraguan border area, though in September of this year Honduras petitioned UNHCR authorities to grant refugee status to the Nicaraguans so that they will have some guarantee of food, medicine and clothing supplies. In November, UNHCR did grant refugee status to the ethnic Nicaraguans, but until they are moved to camps away from the border, no financial support will be forthcoming.

Honduran officials have determined to allow the Indian population to integrate into Honduran society in the sparsely populated Mosquito coast area. The Indians will be provided plots of land and UNHCR will phase out programs in the region as the refugee popu-

lation becomes self-sufficient in food production. This is a unique solution not likely to be followed elsewhere with the other refugees.

The Honduran Government has appointed a single official, Col. Abraham Garcia Turcios, as coordinator of its Honduran Refugee Commission to handle refugee affairs, but has not provided him with staff and resources. UNHCR will spend about \$13 million to assist refugees in Honduras in 1982. Some eight relief agencies work with the Commissioner's office in this effort. Honduras bears some costs, too, including for the land and security of the camps. Honduran relief agencies are active in all of the refugee camps.

SALVADORAN REFUGEES

UNHCR estimates that there are some 220,000 to 270,000 Salvadoran refugees in Central America. From 50,000 to 100,000 are presumed to be in Guatemala; some 120,000 in Mexico; and some 22,000 in Nicaragua. Honduras hosts an estimated 17,000 in the historically troubled border region that was the site of war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. The border area is a guerrilla stronghold on the Salvadoran side. Honduran memories of the earlier war and efforts to contain the guerrillas within El Salvador contribute to problems for Salvadoran refugees in Honduras.

MESA GRANDE

Mesa Grande refugee camp holds about 9,000 refugees. At present the camp is divided into two parts about 1 kilometer apart. The first area is a "tent" camp in which canvas roof and plastic walls form individual rooms that give shelter to about 20 persons each. A cooking area lies between each two dormitory units. The second camp is newer and more permanent, with wooden walls and corrugated metal roofing. These facilities are cheaper to build than the tent rooms and are roomier and airier. It is anticipated that the entire camp will be converted to this "permanent" housing stock over time.

The refugees are served by several relief organizations who work under the general supervision and coordination of UNHCR, which assumed responsibility for all Honduran relief operations in April 1982, after local agencies were found unable to coordinate the effort. Caritas, Catholic Relief, Concern, Medicine sans Frontiers, and other relief organizations were all working at Mesa Grande.

Mesa Grande refugee camp was opened in April 1982, when refugees from La Virtud, Granaja, and several other villages close to the Salvadoran border were moved to this semi-permanent refugee site. UNHCR officials say that about half of the La Virtud residents chose not to make the move from La Virtud to Mesa Grande, and many apparently returned to El Salvador. The population of the camp today is about one-half children, 20 percent adult male and the remainder adult female.

The majority of the people at Mesa Grande have now resided in Honduras for 2 years. UNHCR's roving protection officers still continue to make rounds of the border villages to collect new refugees and bring them to the camp. There apparently is a reliable network or gathering places at which refugee families can wait until

they are picked up. The population of the camp in this way has grown by about 600 in the 6 months since the move.

The authorities in the camp were generally positive in attitude and the population was industrious. The overall impression left by the camp was positive. People were working; the children had an opportunity for rudimentary schooling, and there seemed to be a minimum of health care facilities.

The refugees did not want to talk about their life in Salvador, nor about why they left. One of the resident social workers indicated that after a long time working with the people, he had been able to piece together some stories. For the most part, families had been witness to either wholesale rampage through their villages or more isolated atrocities against family members. Some told of relatives drawn and quartered and the bodies left in the family garden plot, he said. Many others said they had left El Salvador because they couldn't take the violence any more. Some said they left after being warned that the war was coming to their area. Others said they were told to get out. One of the camp officials noted that while the refugees talked very little of their past, many bore deep emotional scars from their experiences. A psychiatrist was desperately needed in the camp staff.

There continues to be some tension between the relief workers and Honduran authorities in the Mesa Grande area. While no incidents between the two have occurred, UNHCR officials noted that they do not trust the local Honduran military authorities. The UNHCR representatives are required to inform the Honduran military of their itineraries when they leave for rounds of the border areas. Because they are concerned that the military may make reprisals against refugees who appear to move into the refugee camp, the roving officers sometimes seek to disguise or confuse their route so as not to be in areas at the time announced. As in other camps on the Salvadoran border, contacts between the Honduran military and refugees and the relief workers seemed to be unpleasant for all parties.

The camp has organized a school. There are about 4,500 children, mostly very young, in the under-10 age group. The camp has 15 well-constructed classrooms with 30-45 students in each class. The school is run in two sessions, morning and afternoon, to accommodate the large numbers. Many of the teachers are recruited from the most educated of the refugee population itself.

Refugees are not permitted to leave the camp area, and even though the camp is fairly spacious, this creates a sense of confinement. However, once a month, UNHCR officials drive a truckful of refugees into town where they make purchases with money they apparently brought with them from El Salvador. To the extent that there are tools and materials available, the residents are very industrious. During our visit, one team of men was busy building permanent housing in one of the two parts of Mesa Grande. In the older camp, they were building bed frames for the various family units. Nevertheless, according to one of the relief workers, boredom is the principal problem in the camp. There is simply not enough for the people to do. He faulted some of the relief organizations for not dealing more directly with this problem.

Almost every living unit had a small (and often rather pitiful) garden plot with tomatoes or flowers growing. One individual had tried to grow corn in his plot. Food supplies seemed adequate, though simple. A nutrition program was available for children up to 7 years and for lactating mothers. There were still a number of start cases of malnutrition among older children not eligible for the supplementary nutrition program. The camp director said that disease was "under control," as were incidents of dehydration, diarrhea and malnutrition. The death rate, especially the infant death rate, had fallen dramatically since the move to Mesa Grande, he noted.

COLOMONCAGUA

The refugee camp at Colomoncagua is a stark contrast to the camp at Mesa Grande. Colomoncagua holds about 7,000 refugees in seven separate areas and lies within 3 kilometers of the Salvadoran border. As in the case at Mesa Grande, the residents of Colomoncagua had been in the camp for about 2 years, and migration to the camp has slowed. However, a group of 27 arrived just the night before we visited. The group, which included an 85-year-old woman and several children, had walked several days from Salvador. This was the first new group to arrive at the camp in about a month, we were informed.

Honduran authorities are convinced that guerrilla elements use the camp for rest and recuperation and that medical and food supplies intended for the refugees are passed to the guerrillas by the residents of the camp and sometimes by representatives of the relief organizations. As a result, security at the camp is much more oppressive than at Mesa Grande, and the resident UNHCR representative has protested to local authorities and to his superior in Tegucigalpa that his activities and those of the agencies working with him are severely constrained. Among the complaints UNHCR has made are that—

- Restrictions on the stock of food permitted in the camp stores has caused the people to run out of food on some weekends;
- Permission to bring supplies into the camp is given only on Monday and Thursday with the result that fresh meat and produce have often rotted on trucks waiting in the city;
- Restrictions on the hours UNHCR personnel can be in the camp (from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.) are 2 hours shorter than customary and authorized;
- Restrictions on the movements of the refugees from one camp to another within the overall area of seven camps mean that extended families are sometimes prohibited from seeing each other;
- Limits on the wood that can be cut for fuel leaves an inadequate supply of cooking fuel within the camp;
- UNHCR medical personnel are or have been denied entry to the camp during the night to attend the sick;
- Restrictions on the area refugees may walk out of the immediate camp area to a range of 100 meters from the camp site have caused problems in locating latrines, among other things.

In addition, the refugees themselves complained that local police abuse and harass them after the curfew. One woman told me that the soldiers broke into the tents at night shouting, scaring the children, and finally dragging everyone outside for interrogation. Another woman slipped me a hand-written note putting forth the complaints of the residents of the camp against the Honduran army. The note, which was written in eloquent, but badly spelled Spanish, said:

"We the refugees of Colomoncagua (province), Honduras, feel obliged to present our denunciation to all of the Committees in Solidarity with the Refugee Situations, to the United Nations High Commissioner, to the International Commission for Human Rights; in short, to all of the peoples of the world who, with the arrival of this humble note, may hear our denunciations, which are an echo of what we live.

"We live in our own flesh everything committed by the Honduran army, which imposes great repression on us. We ask (you) please to put pressure on our sister republic Honduras not to exercise repression on the institutions that watch for the security of us refugees.

"(1) We in the nutrition center find ourselves obliged to denounce the injustice done to the children suffering malnutrition, seeing that these children are in danger of losing their lives;

"(2) Because of the Honduran army, children have died because they had no food, because they won't let us bring the food into the camps.

"(3) What they let us bring up is bad—the meat is spoiled; the vegetables rotten. Instead of helping the children, it makes them sick. As a refugee, when I see this injustice, I have to think about denunciations.

"(4) The nutritionists do everything possible to bring in the food, endangering their own lives for us.

"(5) The soldiers say, 'Let them all die; it doesn't matter to [us],' and for that we pray that the buzzards consume those dogs. Every car that comes here, comes a soldier with it.

"(6) They threatened one UNHCR representative, saying they would report her as being in solidarity (with the guerrillas) and that she could lose her life; and the man from immigration named Vicente did this; we saw it.

I hope our petitions are heard.

SIGNED —————

For their part, the Honduran military interviewed in the camp and later the commander of the local region who hosted us for lunch said that they knew of guerrillas who used the camp for their "rest" and therefore they, the soldiers, regarded it as a dangerous area. When asked how they knew these people, the soldiers said that they "would see a face in the camp for a time, and they all of a sudden that face would disappear."

The Salvadoran peasants probably do have a justified fear of the Honduran army. The members of their Salvadoran families may have been among the families pushed back out of Honduras in the 1969 Soccer War. At the same time, Honduras has a continuing

fear of being "invaded" by the Salvadorans—a part of the tradition of national hostilities between these two countries. For this reason, Honduran authorities are very concerned that the refugees remain inside the camps. Equally important is the proximity of the camp to one of the most conflictive regions of El Salvador, Chalatenango Province. The Honduran officials are not anxious to have the guerrilla war exported to their country.

For these reasons, it is strongly felt that the residents of Colomoncagua would be much better off if the camp were moved away from the border area as Mesa Grande had been. Similar stories both of official brutality and of guerrilla use of the camp had been heard earlier at La Virtud, but for the most part everyone was convinced that there were few such problems at its successor, Mesa Grande. The people of Colomoncagua did not want to discuss moving the camp at all. The teachers in one of the sub-camps showed fear at the mention of a move and refused to talk about it, saying "We know nothing of that." Their fear stemmed from concern for their fate in an unknown, distant camp or the prospect that they would "disappear" in such a move. UNHCR apparently did not want to discuss the subject with the residents, either, though it is currently negotiating with the Honduran Government for a tract of land about 100 kilometers from the border inside Honduras as a future site for the present group at Colomoncagua. UNHCR has found Honduran authorities slow to react to petitions for allocation of this land.

NICARAGUAN REFUGEES

Danli is a small town in the south of Honduras in El Paraiso Department about 30 kilometers from the Nicaraguan border. It has become the center of a new refugee movement of about 3,650 Nicaraguan peasants who have left their homes over the past year. This group of refugees is in addition to the Nicaraguans who crossed the border in 1979 after the fall of Somoza. Many of these now have established residency and work in Honduras.

In contrast to the situation in Mosquitia or along the Salvadoran border, there was no formal refugee camp in the Danli area. Some of the Nicaraguan refugees stay with distant Honduran relatives (the border has been permeable for a long time). Some stay in the homes of Honduran peasants or of earlier Nicaraguan emigres, and some in local relief centers. There were about 364 refugees in a camp at Las Trojes about 30 kilometers over bad roads from Danli. In Danli itself, some 105 refugees had gathered in an abandoned building and were receiving assistance from the local Catholic Church and from an organization formed by earlier Nicaraguan refugees, the Nicaraguan Refugee Civic Humanitarian Association. The local priest has managed to get assistance from Honduran charities, including Catholic Relief (CEDEN). The agencies provide powdered milk and cooking oil, which he distributes on Sundays to refugees from the entire area. In addition, a doctor from the area will see refugees on Sunday. The priest is seeking help from another doctor who would answer calls during the week. Medical and nutritional attention is desperately needed because of the very large population of children and babies. UNHCR received an

appeal in early September to declare refugee status for the Danli Nicaraguans. Such a declaration would open the possibilities for considerable additional outside assistance to the refugees in the region. On the political side, it would permit Honduras to (1) assemble the refugees into a single camp where control would be easier, (2) dispense with the important role of the Nicaraguan relief organization whose participation possibly complicates Honduras' relations with Nicaragua. Additional assistance will be necessary if the population continues to grow, for the local economy, which is already suffering from high unemployment, simply cannot support the burden of so many additional people.

Of the refugee areas visited, Danli was the only area where one saw many young men. We talked to several in the center in Danli, asking why they had left and how. The responses were uniform: Either they had left because they did not want to be pressed into the militia or because they did not agree with or conform to the system being imposed by the (militant) Sandinistas. The peasant farmers said they resented their food being taken away. One explained that "there is corn, because that is what we grow there (back home), and we know how to do that. But everything is taken away, and we don't get any. We are issued a tiny quantity of coffee, 2 pounds of sugar and 5 pounds of corn per week (clearly not sufficient for the dietary need)." For this allotment, the farmer continued, one had to stand long hours in line, and sometimes they would run out before one got to the front. One farmer said that for 1 month he had not got any food at all. Another complained that they had taken all his chickens and no one could get any chicken. Two of the farmers we spoke with had been in jail, one a week, and another for 23 days. Both said they had been treated badly in jail. But several observed that if you don't go to their "meetings," you are frowned upon and watched as a discontent. Complaining that they did not want to serve in the militia, two young men described the "militarization" of the community. Even the priest carries his "Galil," one said.

The refugees in Danli complained that they were not allowed to travel out of their villages in Nicaragua, even to see relatives in other towns. It was not clear whether this was because they were regarded as discontents or such restrictions were a common practice.

There appears to have been a year-long, slow attrition from the villages of the border area. However, the pace has stepped up recently. In September, about 200 new refugees appeared in the Danli area. In the last week of October, another 200 were registered by the local relief organization. The refugees appear to leave either singly, disappearing into the mountains at night to walk out alone or, when the Sandinista units are fighting with the *contras* or counterrevolutionary forces in the border area, whole families take the opportunity to leave. The refugees admit coordination between the *contras* operating along the border area and the discontented villages. The *contra* leaders inform families when a battle was going to take place so that they will be prepared to make their departure. One of the 1979-period emigres said that the Sandinistas had pulled forces back from the border for about 50 kilometers and the counterrevolutionaries could run freely in that border region

within Nicaragua. One of the peasants described an engagement in which 30 Nicaraguan soldiers had been killed by a *contra* party.

The Nicaraguan refugees recognize the delicate political problem this border presents to the Hondurans. They were very careful to avoid reference to *contra* operations out of Honduras, but rather suggested the outfits were operating in Nicaragua. All of the Nicaraguans with whom we spoke, whether of the newly arrived group or the 1979 group, focused their anger at the militant Marxist Sandinistas in power in Nicaragua at present, not at the revolution that overthrew Somoza. Several recognized that Somoza had not been good, and that it was not desirable to return to that state of affairs, but they rebelled against the "militarization of society" under the Sandinista militants, against the government taking away their personal property, as well as against the scarcity they currently suffered.

The peasants suggested they had knowledge of Cubans working with the new government. They mentioned Cubans in the hospitals and in the larger towns, but none reported Cuban advisors working in their own villages.

The number of young men in the Danli group prompted us to question whether they intended to join the *contras*. One responded that he had come to re-establish his family and that would come first. But if he was successful in doing that and could leave the family in security, he might seriously consider joining the *contras*. The Honduran Refugee Commissioner has acknowledged that there are "counterrevolutionaries" among the Nicaraguan refugees living in Honduras. However, he denies that they take part in armed action against Nicaragua. The Commissioner argued that the refugees are too far from the border and moreover they are watched by the Honduran army.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Honduras has not traditionally had a serious human rights problem. However, increasing political tension in the region has begun to spill over into Honduras. There have been reports in the Honduran press of disappearances. One family, Marquis Vega, has taken full page ads protesting the disappearance of a son.

Human rights groups estimate a total of about 80 disappearances in Honduras. The President of the Honduran Committee for the Defense of Human Rights believes his group has 60 convincing cases of disappearances from 1981 and 32 from 1982. The commission has reported cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. However, it has been frustrated by the Commission's requirement that there be documentation showing that legal channels for locating a presumed disappeared have been exhausted. His commission has presented four petitions of habeas corpus to authorities, but has received no responses to date.

Conversations with representatives of the labor movement, the Honduran press, university faculty and church leaders support (1) there is a hardening of attitudes about leftist activities and a growing fear that there will be more disappearances, but that to date this is not a serious problem; (2) there is no systematic order to disappearances or even harassment of the left yet; (3) to the extent that leftists are attacking the benign left while the hardcore left remains underground, such tactics could serve to radicalize the existing social balance; (4) rural violence does occur and is endemic; local police sergeants have near absolute authority over peasantry in their districts and abuse this authority regularly; (5) there is a growing parallel awareness of (a) increased leftist subversive activities and (b) the need to avoid the polarization that occurred in El Salvador. It is apparent from conversations that Honduran authorities have a great deal of trouble dealing with both of these problems simultaneously.

There are efforts to control police violence. U.S. officials stated that the Honduran authorities have become more sophisticated in dealing with subversives over the past year. Parliamentary leaders acknowledge that the legal system has to be made adequate to the task of dealing in human and civil rights in a democratic context. Recently, following the San Pedro Sula hostage crisis, the regional police commander in San Pedro was replaced by an individual who promised "in the future we will operate strictly within the law and we will make procedure work more efficiently so that people who are detained can leave within the time frame dictated by the law [24 hours]. . . . Archaic methods must be eliminated; we are going to use scientific methods. . . ." [*El Tiempo*, October 1, 1982]. A skeptic

tic might be disheartened to learn that the man was trained in criminology in Argentina.

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